TriCipher's been in the news a lot lately, and that's good for them and for the whole multifactor movement. We like to see pickup on this technology, no matter whose it is.
http://internetcommunications.tmcnet.com/topics/broadband-mobile/articles/7666-tricipher-takes-identity-theft-prevention-mobile.htm
This article discussed the fact that they've released a USB-based solution, something near and dear to our hearts, because we also use a USB-driven system at Enterprise-in-a-Flash (http://www.enterpriseinaflash.com).
I'm concerned about the fact that they're allowing for customer self-provisioning. I'm not sure a bank would let you self-provision your ATM card onto any blank card you could get your hands on, and I'm not sure it makes sense to trust a user-provisioned authentication factor that they've put onto any unknown USB drive. But I'll have to see more about this before making a final judgment.
Tuesday, June 19, 2007
Another Great Example
This blog entry by Dave Jevans presents another excellent example of a case where multi-factor authentication would have been valuable in preventing a costly security breach.
http://blog.ironkey.com/?p=136
Interestingly, the comment at the bottom of the page indicates that multi-factor authentication systems are vulnerable to Man In The Middle attacks. While that's true for the traditional One Time Password devices like RSA SecurID, it's not the case for more modern systems, including (shameless plug coming) the USB Flash Key based system offered by Enterprise-in-a-Flash (www.enterpriseinaflash.com), as well as numerous other innovative solutions on the market today. I'm hoping people start to learn more about the options and see that the market is responding to the requirements...
http://blog.ironkey.com/?p=136
Interestingly, the comment at the bottom of the page indicates that multi-factor authentication systems are vulnerable to Man In The Middle attacks. While that's true for the traditional One Time Password devices like RSA SecurID, it's not the case for more modern systems, including (shameless plug coming) the USB Flash Key based system offered by Enterprise-in-a-Flash (www.enterpriseinaflash.com), as well as numerous other innovative solutions on the market today. I'm hoping people start to learn more about the options and see that the market is responding to the requirements...
Tuesday, June 5, 2007
Alternative Authentication Methods
This article is a great primer on non-hardware multifactor authentication - things like face identification rather than passwords, voice pattern recognition, typing pattern recognition, etc.
http://www.networkworld.com/research/2007/060407-multifactor-authentication.html?page=1
While these methods sound innovative and flexible, I remain somewhat skeptical - if someone tries hard enough, there must be a way to spoof a voice or typing pattern, for instance. I don't pretend to know how, but I've got to assume it exists.
For my money, I'd look at these methods as 3rd factor authentication mechanisms, and stick with a solid hardware token - back to the "online ATM card" analogy - as my primary authentication credential.
http://www.networkworld.com/research/2007/060407-multifactor-authentication.html?page=1
While these methods sound innovative and flexible, I remain somewhat skeptical - if someone tries hard enough, there must be a way to spoof a voice or typing pattern, for instance. I don't pretend to know how, but I've got to assume it exists.
For my money, I'd look at these methods as 3rd factor authentication mechanisms, and stick with a solid hardware token - back to the "online ATM card" analogy - as my primary authentication credential.
Banks Still Don't Get It
This article discusses the ongoing problems in the banking industry as they attempt to comply with guidance requiring multifactor authentication for their websites.
http://www.emediawire.com/releases/2007/6/emw530454.htm
Asking a bunch of questions, or even requiring users to type in One Time Password codes, simply doesn't get the job done. A true cooperative authentication process is the only way to accomplish the goal, using something the user has in his or her possession to anchor one end of the authentication protocol.
http://www.emediawire.com/releases/2007/6/emw530454.htm
Asking a bunch of questions, or even requiring users to type in One Time Password codes, simply doesn't get the job done. A true cooperative authentication process is the only way to accomplish the goal, using something the user has in his or her possession to anchor one end of the authentication protocol.
Tuesday, May 15, 2007
Example of a Man in the Middle attack on One Time Password systems
Here's a great example of an attack focused on Citibank a few months ago, where a Man in the Middle exploit was used to defeat a One Time Password implementation of 2-factor authentication.
http://blog.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2006/07/citibank_phish_spoofs_2factor_1.html
If it's just data that you type in, it can be stolen, spoofed, or passed through, leaving you no better off than before.
http://blog.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2006/07/citibank_phish_spoofs_2factor_1.html
If it's just data that you type in, it can be stolen, spoofed, or passed through, leaving you no better off than before.
Paypal's getting the message
Paypal recently rolled out a 2-factor authentication option:
https://www.paypal.com/securitykey
The trouble here - and with any One Time Password (OTP) device - is that these systems are quite vulnerable to Man in the Middle (MITM) attacks. If a thief can get in between your browser and the server, they can pass through your OTP along with your other credentials without your knowledge, and hijack your session at that point, once the server believes a valid session has been established.
What's really needed here is a second channel of authentication and security, relying on a physical hardware device (Something You Have) that can only be checked dynamically by the software system itself, and that is completely independent of the actual systems you're trying to access (i.e. banking website).
https://www.paypal.com/securitykey
The trouble here - and with any One Time Password (OTP) device - is that these systems are quite vulnerable to Man in the Middle (MITM) attacks. If a thief can get in between your browser and the server, they can pass through your OTP along with your other credentials without your knowledge, and hijack your session at that point, once the server believes a valid session has been established.
What's really needed here is a second channel of authentication and security, relying on a physical hardware device (Something You Have) that can only be checked dynamically by the software system itself, and that is completely independent of the actual systems you're trying to access (i.e. banking website).
Wikipedia entry for our topic
The Wikipedia entry for 2-factor authentication is not bad. We hope to participate in enhancing it further.
For reference, here's the URL:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Two_Factor_Authentication
For reference, here's the URL:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Two_Factor_Authentication
Online Banking
Similar to the previous post regarding online commerce, every time you log into your bank you're conducting a 1-factor authenticated transaction. Sure, Bank of America has "SiteKey" which asks you for additional knowledge-based credentials (Something You Know) but other than a clever image-oriented system to help you avoid entering those credentials into a fake version of their website, this system, and systems like it, don't help protect you. They help prevent your credentials from being stolen, sure, but as we saw in the Dateline piece, those credentials are fairly easy to obtain or guess - and once obtained, you're in big trouble.
What's needed is a true 2-factor authentication system to validate your identity before you log into the bank website.
The Financial Services Technology Consortium issued recommendations on this subject, available at the following URL:
http://www.fstc.org/projects/docs/Recommendations_and_Requirements_for_BMA_v1.0.pdf
We wholeheartedly agree with this document, especially their statement that “no authentication system should rely solely on passwords or other knowledge-based queries or shared secrets. If a password should be compromised, it must not be feasible for an impostor to defeat authentication with just knowledge of a password and an associated claim—e.g., userid, account number, name, SSN.”
What's needed is a true 2-factor authentication system to validate your identity before you log into the bank website.
The Financial Services Technology Consortium issued recommendations on this subject, available at the following URL:
http://www.fstc.org/projects/docs/Recommendations_and_Requirements_for_BMA_v1.0.pdf
We wholeheartedly agree with this document, especially their statement that “no authentication system should rely solely on passwords or other knowledge-based queries or shared secrets. If a password should be compromised, it must not be feasible for an impostor to defeat authentication with just knowledge of a password and an associated claim—e.g., userid, account number, name, SSN.”
Online Commerce
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17822386/
This Dateline piece makes it abundantly clear just how easily a thief can obtain credentials - like a credit card number, password, user ID, etc - and wreak havoc on a victim in a matter of minutes. Some scams are more elaborate than others, but the bottom line is always the same - if you can type in a few pieces of information, the computer on the other end of the line doesn't know the difference between you and the real owner of those credentials.
That's what 2-factor authentication is for. If the merchants in this story required a physical authentication device (Something You Have) in addition to the knowledge-based authentication (Something You Know) the thieves would have no way to use the data they've collected to do any damage.
This Dateline piece makes it abundantly clear just how easily a thief can obtain credentials - like a credit card number, password, user ID, etc - and wreak havoc on a victim in a matter of minutes. Some scams are more elaborate than others, but the bottom line is always the same - if you can type in a few pieces of information, the computer on the other end of the line doesn't know the difference between you and the real owner of those credentials.
That's what 2-factor authentication is for. If the merchants in this story required a physical authentication device (Something You Have) in addition to the knowledge-based authentication (Something You Know) the thieves would have no way to use the data they've collected to do any damage.
Wednesday, May 2, 2007
Introduction
This blog is dedicated to the discussion of 2-factor authentication. What is 2-factor authentication, you ask? Well, think of an ATM - to log in and get cash, you need to present your card and a PIN. The card is something you have - a physical token. The PIN is something you know - an information token. Each one is a "factor" of authentication, contributing to the ATM network's ability to verify your identity. This premise is critical to effective security in any online transaction - whether you're logging into your PC remotely, accessing your bank account, or working on a corporate application. Without true 2-factor authentication - a physical token and an information token - it's just too easy for an attacker to gain unauthorized access to private information. That's because passwords are so simple to steal, buy, or guess. The physical token, an item that only you have in your possession, is the crucial piece of the puzzle. In this blog, we'll endeavor to discuss the latest advances in 2-factor (and 3- or more factor) authentication, as well as talk about security incidents that could have been avoided by using 2-factor authentication to verify the identities of the individuals involved.
In the interests of full disclosure, my colleagues and I on this blog are also part of the team at Plethora Technology, producers of the 2-factor authenticated information access and sharing system Enterprise-in-a-Flash. More information at www.enterpriseinaflash.com. From time to time we may post about our own product, but in general, this blog is intended to foster discussion about 2-factor authentication as an important idea for security in today's world, no matter whose product is implementing it.
In the interests of full disclosure, my colleagues and I on this blog are also part of the team at Plethora Technology, producers of the 2-factor authenticated information access and sharing system Enterprise-in-a-Flash. More information at www.enterpriseinaflash.com. From time to time we may post about our own product, but in general, this blog is intended to foster discussion about 2-factor authentication as an important idea for security in today's world, no matter whose product is implementing it.
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